Merge remote-tracking branch 'userns/for-next'

[karo-tx-linux.git] / fs / namei.c

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 5d4645e6537691677ba91a488bfb149c24fa0b08..2b729d253715ba183e912fae98cfec1e68665e24 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -955,26 +955,23 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
  *  - sysctl_protected_hardlinks enabled
  *  - fsuid does not match inode
  *  - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above)
- *  - not CAP_FOWNER
+ *  - not CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the inode owner uid mapped
  *
  * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
  */
 static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
 {
-       const struct cred *cred;
        struct inode *inode;
 
        if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
                return 0;
 
-       cred = current_cred();
        inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
 
        /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
         * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
         */
-       if (uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
-           capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+       if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) || safe_hardlink_source(inode))
                return 0;
 
        audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link);
@@ -1969,7 +1966,7 @@ OK:
                if (err) {
                        const char *s = get_link(nd);
 
-                       if (unlikely(IS_ERR(s)))
+                       if (IS_ERR(s))
                                return PTR_ERR(s);
                        err = 0;
                        if (unlikely(!s)) {
@@ -3457,7 +3454,7 @@ struct file *do_file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
                return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
 
        filename = getname_kernel(name);
-       if (unlikely(IS_ERR(filename)))
+       if (IS_ERR(filename))
                return ERR_CAST(filename);
 
        set_nameidata(&nd, -1, filename);