An execve with a very large total of argument/environment strings
can take a really long time in the execve system call. It runs
uninterruptibly to count and copy all the strings. This change
makes it abort the exec quickly if sent a SIGKILL.
Note that this is the conservative change, to interrupt only for
SIGKILL, by using fatal_signal_pending(). It would be perfectly
correct semantics to let any signal interrupt the string-copying in
execve, i.e. use signal_pending() instead of fatal_signal_pending().
We'll save that change for later, since it could have user-visible
consequences, such as having a timer set too quickly make it so that
an execve can never complete, though it always happened to work before.
This adds a preemption point during the copying of the argument and
environment strings for execve, in copy_strings(). There is already
a preemption point in the count() loop, so this doesn't add any new
points in the abstract sense.
When the total argument+environment strings are very large, the time
spent copying them can be much more than a normal user time slice.
So this change improves the interactivity of the rest of the system
when one process is doing an execve with very large arguments.
The CONFIG_STACK_GROWSDOWN variant of setup_arg_pages() does not
check the size of the argument/environment area on the stack.
When it is unworkably large, shift_arg_pages() hits its BUG_ON.
This is exploitable with a very large RLIMIT_STACK limit, to
create a crash pretty easily.
Check that the initial stack is not too large to make it possible
to map in any executable. We're not checking that the actual
executable (or intepreter, for binfmt_elf) will fit. So those
mappings might clobber part of the initial stack mapping. But
that is just userland lossage that userland made happen, not a
kernel problem.
For carrier detection to work properly when binding the driver with a cable
unplugged, netif_carrier_off() should be called after register_netdev(),
not before.
Signed-off-by: Paul Fertser <fercerpav@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Unfortunately, this stack pointer can't be used when translation is off
on PHYP as this stack pointer might be outside the RMO. This results in
the following on all non zero cpus:
cpu 0x1: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c00000001639fd10]
pc: 000000000001c50c
lr: 000000000000821c
sp: c00000001639ff90
msr: 8000000000001000
dar: c00000001639ffa0
dsisr: 42000000
current = 0xc000000016393540
paca = 0xc000000006e00200
pid = 0, comm = swapper
The original patch was only tested on bare metal system, so it never
caught this problem.
This changes __secondary_start so that we calculate the new stack
pointer but only start using it after we've called early_setup_secondary.
With this patch, the above problem goes away.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
As early setup calls down to slb_initialize(), we must have kstack
initialised before checking "should we add a bolted SLB entry for our kstack?"
Failing to do so means stack access requires an SLB miss exception to refill
an entry dynamically, if the stack isn't accessible via SLB(0) (kernel text
& static data). It's not always allowable to take such a miss, and
intermittent crashes will result.
Primary CPUs don't have this issue; an SLB entry is not bolted for their
stack anyway (as that lives within SLB(0)). This patch therefore only
affects the init of secondaries.
Signed-off-by: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
After walking the multicast list to set up the hash filter, this
function will walk off the end of the list when filling the
exact-match entries. This was fixed in mainline by the interface
change made in commit f9dcbcc9e338d08c0f7de7eba4eaafbbb7f81249.
Reported-by: spamalot@hispeed.ch
Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15355 Reported-by: Jason Heeris <jason.heeris@gmail.com>
Reference: http://bugs.debian.org/600155 Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
As reported in <https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15355>, r6040_
multicast_list currently crashes. This is due a wrong maximum of multicast
entries. This patch fixes the following issues with multicast:
- number of maximum entries if off-by-one (4 instead of 3)
- the writing of the hash table index is not necessary and leads to invalid
values being written into the MCR1 register, so the MAC is simply put in a non
coherent state
- when we exceed the maximum number of mutlticast address, writing the
broadcast address should be done in registers MID_1{L,M,H} instead of
MID_O{L,M,H}, otherwise we would loose the adapter's MAC address
[bwh: Adjust for 2.6.32; should also apply to 2.6.27]
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
adapter->cmb.cmb is initialized when the device is opened and freed when
it's closed. Accessing it unconditionally during resume results either
in a crash (NULL pointer dereference, when the interface has not been
opened yet) or data corruption (when the interface has been used and
brought down adapter->cmb.cmb points to a deallocated memory area).
Signed-off-by: Luca Tettamanti <kronos.it@gmail.com> Acked-by: Chris Snook <chris.snook@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When a driver doesn't fill the entire buffer, old
heap contents may remain, and if it also doesn't
update the length properly, this old heap content
will be copied back to userspace.
It is very unlikely that this happens in any of
the drivers using private ioctls since it would
show up as junk being reported by iwpriv, but it
seems better to be safe here, so use kzalloc.
Reported-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When using simultaneously the two DMA channels on a same engine, some
transfers are never completed. For example, an endless lock can occur
while writing heavily on a RAID5 array (with async-tx offload support
enabled).
Note that this issue can also be reproduced by using the DMA test
client.
On a same engine, the interrupt cause register is shared between two
DMA channels. This patch make sure that the cause bit is only cleared
for the requested channel.
Signed-off-by: Simon Guinot <sguinot@lacie.com> Tested-by: Luc Saillard <luc@saillard.org> Acked-by: saeed bishara <saeed.bishara@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The compat code for the VIDIOCSMICROCODE ioctl is totally buggered.
It's only used by the VIDEO_STRADIS driver, and that one is scheduled to
staging and eventually removed unless somebody steps up to maintain it
(at which point it should use request_firmware() rather than some magic
ioctl). So we'll get rid of it eventually.
But in the meantime, the compatibility ioctl code is broken, and this
tries to get it to at least limp along (even if Mauro suggested just
deleting it entirely, which may be the right thing to do - I don't think
the compatibility translation code has ever worked unless you were very
lucky).
The snd_ctl_new() function in sound/core/control.c allocates space for a
snd_kcontrol struct by performing arithmetic operations on a
user-provided size without checking for integer overflow. If a user
provides a large enough size, an overflow will occur, the allocated
chunk will be too small, and a second user-influenced value will be
written repeatedly past the bounds of this chunk. This code is
reachable by unprivileged users who have permission to open
a /dev/snd/controlC* device (on many distros, this is group "audio") via
the SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD and SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_REPLACE ioctls.
The SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG_INFO and
SNDRV_HDSP_IOCTL_GET_CONFIG_INFO ioctls in hdspm.c and hdsp.c allow
unprivileged users to read uninitialized kernel stack memory, because
several fields of the hdsp{m}_config_info structs declared on the stack
are not altered or zeroed before being copied back to the user. This
patch takes care of it.
pa-risc and ia64 have stacks that grow upwards. Check that
they do not run into other mappings. By making VM_GROWSUP
0x0 on architectures that do not ever use it, we can avoid
some unpleasant #ifdefs in check_stack_guard_page().
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: dann frazier <dannf@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long. This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.
In commit d4d6715, we reopened an old hole for a 64-bit ptracer touching a
32-bit tracee in system call entry. A %rax value set via ptrace at the
entry tracing stop gets used whole as a 32-bit syscall number, while we
only check the low 32 bits for validity.
Fix it by truncating %rax back to 32 bits after syscall_trace_enter,
in addition to testing the full 64 bits as has already been added.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz> Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
All bits in the values read from registers to be used for the next
write were getting overwritten, avoid doing so to not mess with the
current configuration.
The spec notes that fan0 and fan1 control mode bits are located in bits
7-6 and 5-4 respectively, but the FAN_CTRL_MODE macro was making the
bits shift by 5 instead of by 4.
compat_alloc_user_space() expects the caller to independently call
access_ok() to verify the returned area. A missing call could
introduce problems on some architectures.
This patch incorporates the access_ok() check into
compat_alloc_user_space() and also adds a sanity check on the length.
The existing compat_alloc_user_space() implementations are renamed
arch_compat_alloc_user_space() and are used as part of the
implementation of the new global function.
This patch assumes NULL will cause __get_user()/__put_user() to either
fail or access userspace on all architectures. This should be
followed by checking the return value of compat_access_user_space()
for NULL in the callers, at which time the access_ok() in the callers
can also be removed.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
On 64 bits, we always, by necessity, jump through the system call
table via %rax. For 32-bit system calls, in theory the system call
number is stored in %eax, and the code was testing %eax for a valid
system call number. At one point we loaded the stored value back from
the stack to enforce zero-extension, but that was removed in checkin d4d67150165df8bf1cc05e532f6efca96f907cab. An actual 32-bit process
will not be able to introduce a non-zero-extended number, but it can
happen via ptrace.
Instead of re-introducing the zero-extension, test what we are
actually going to use, i.e. %rax. This only adds a handful of REX
prefixes to the code.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
I have been seeing problems on Tegra 2 (ARMv7 SMP) systems with HIGHMEM
enabled on 2.6.35 (plus some patches targetted at 2.6.36 to perform cache
maintenance lazily), and the root cause appears to be that the mm bouncing
code is calling flush_dcache_page before it copies the bounce buffer into
the bio.
The bounced page needs to be flushed after data is copied into it, to
ensure that architecture implementations can synchronize instruction and
data caches if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Gary King <gking@nvidia.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This is an off by one. We would go past the end when we NUL terminate
the "value" string at end of the function. The "value" buffer is
allocated in irlan_client_parse_response() or
irlan_provider_parse_command().
CC: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reading the file set_ftrace_filter does three things.
1) shows whether or not filters are set for the function tracer
2) shows what functions are set for the function tracer
3) shows what triggers are set on any functions
3 is independent from 1 and 2.
The way this file currently works is that it is a state machine,
and as you read it, it may change state. But this assumption breaks
when you use lseek() on the file. The state machine gets out of sync
and the t_show() may use the wrong pointer and cause a kernel oops.
Luckily, this will only kill the app that does the lseek, but the app
dies while holding a mutex. This prevents anyone else from using the
set_ftrace_filter file (or any other function tracing file for that matter).
A real fix for this is to rewrite the code, but that is too much for
a -rc release or stable. This patch simply disables llseek on the
set_ftrace_filter() file for now, and we can do the proper fix for the
next major release.
Reported-by: Robert Swiecki <swiecki@google.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugene@redhat.com> Cc: vendor-sec@lst.de Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The 5 GHz CTL indexes were not being read for all hardware
devices due to the masking out through the CTL_MODE_M mask
being one bit too short. Without this the calibrated regulatory
maximum values were not being picked up when devices operate
on 5 GHz in HT40 mode. The final output power used for Atheros
devices is the minimum between the calibrated CTL values and
what CRDA provides.
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <lrodriguez@atheros.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The error handling in snd_seq_oss_open() has several bad codes that
do dereferecing released pointers and double-free of kmalloc'ed data.
The object dp is release in free_devinfo() that is called via
private_free callback. The rest shouldn't touch this object any more.
The patch changes delete_port() to call kfree() in any case, and gets
rid of unnecessary calls of destructors in snd_seq_oss_open().
If we can't read the firmware for a device from the disk, and yet the
device already has a valid firmware image in it, we don't want to
replace the firmware with something invalid. So check the version
number to be less than the current one to verify this is the correct
thing to do.
Reported-by: Chris Beauchamp <chris@chillibean.tv> Tested-by: Chris Beauchamp <chris@chillibean.tv> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
>Try the navman driver instead. You can either add the device id to the
> driver and rebuild it, or do this before you plug the device in:
> modprobe navman
> echo -n "0x0df7 0x0900" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/navman/new_id
>
> and then plug your device in and see if that works.
I can confirm that the navman driver works with the right device IDs on
my i-gotU GT-600, which has the same device IDs. Attached is a patch
adding the IDs.
From: Ross Burton <ross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Userspace controls the amount of memory to be allocate, so it can
get the ioctl to allocate more memory than the kernel uses, and get
access to kernel stack. This can only be done for processes authenticated
to the X server for DRI access, and if the user has DRI access.
Fix is to just memset the data to 0 if the user doesn't copy into
it in the first place.
It doesn't like pattern and explicit rules to be on the same line,
and it seems to be more picky when matching file (or really directory)
names with different numbers of trailing slashes.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Andrew Benton <b3nton@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch adds a limit for nframes as the number of frames in TX_SETUP and
RX_SETUP are derived from a single byte multiplex value by default.
Use-cases that would require to send/filter more than 256 CAN frames should
be implemented in userspace for complexity reasons anyway.
Additionally the assignments of unsigned values from userspace to signed
values in kernelspace and vice versa are fixed by using unsigned values in
kernelspace consistently.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Acked-by: Urs Thuermann <urs.thuermann@volkswagen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
As we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of
symlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks.
This should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree
as in the /proc/net -> /proc/self/net example.
This does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories.
ls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Florian Mickler <florian@mickler.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
"Paul Smith" <psmith@gnu.org> reported that we would fail
to build with a new check that may be enabled in an
upcoming version of make.
The error was:
Makefile:442: *** mixed implicit and normal rules. Stop.
The problem is that we did stuff like this:
config %config: ...
The solution was simple - the above was split into two with identical
prerequisites and commands.
With only three lines it was not worth to try to avoid the duplication.
Cc: "Paul Smith" <psmith@gnu.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Thomas Backlund <tmb@mandriva.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This commit makes the stack guard page somewhat less visible to user
space. It does this by:
- not showing the guard page in /proc/<pid>/maps
It looks like lvm-tools will actually read /proc/self/maps to figure
out where all its mappings are, and effectively do a specialized
"mlockall()" in user space. By not showing the guard page as part of
the mapping (by just adding PAGE_SIZE to the start for grows-up
pages), lvm-tools ends up not being aware of it.
- by also teaching the _real_ mlock() functionality not to try to lock
the guard page.
That would just expand the mapping down to create a new guard page,
so there really is no point in trying to lock it in place.
It would perhaps be nice to show the guard page specially in
/proc/<pid>/maps (or at least mark grow-down segments some way), but
let's not open ourselves up to more breakage by user space from programs
that depends on the exact deails of the 'maps' file.
Special thanks to Henrique de Moraes Holschuh for diving into lvm-tools
source code to see what was going on with the whole new warning.
[Note, for .27, only the /proc change is done, mlock is not modified
here. - gregkh]
Reported-and-tested-by: François Valenduc <francois.valenduc@tvcablenet.be Reported-by: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
We do in fact need to unmap the page table _before_ doing the whole
stack guard page logic, because if it is needed (mainly 32-bit x86 with
PAE and CONFIG_HIGHPTE, but other architectures may use it too) then it
will do a kmap_atomic/kunmap_atomic.
And those kmaps will create an atomic region that we cannot do
allocations in. However, the whole stack expand code will need to do
anon_vma_prepare() and vma_lock_anon_vma() and they cannot do that in an
atomic region.
Now, a better model might actually be to do the anon_vma_prepare() when
_creating_ a VM_GROWSDOWN segment, and not have to worry about any of
this at page fault time. But in the meantime, this is the
straightforward fix for the issue.
See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16588 for details.
Reported-by: Wylda <wylda@volny.cz> Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Reported-by: Mike Pagano <mpagano@gentoo.org> Reported-by: François Valenduc <francois.valenduc@tvcablenet.be> Tested-by: Ed Tomlinson <edt@aei.ca> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Tetsuo Handa reports seeing the WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL) in
security_vm_enough_memory(), when do_execve() is touching the
target mm's stack, to set up its args and environment.
Yes, a UMH_NO_WAIT or UMH_WAIT_PROC call_usermodehelper() spawns
an mm-less kernel thread to do the exec. And in any case, that
vm_enough_memory check when growing stack ought to be done on the
target mm, not on the execer's mm (though apart from the warning,
it only makes a slight tweak to OVERCOMMIT_NEVER behaviour).
This is my backport to the .27 kernel tree, hopefully preserving
the same functionality.
Original commit message:
It's wrong for several reasons, but the most direct one is that the
fault may be for the stack accesses to set up a previous SIGBUS. When
we have a kernel exception, the kernel exception handler does all the
fixups, not some user-level signal handler.
Even apart from the nested SIGBUS issue, it's also wrong to give out
kernel fault addresses in the signal handler info block, or to send a
SIGBUS when a system call already returns EFAULT.
.. which didn't show up in my tests because it's a no-op on x86-64 and
most other architectures. But we enter the function with the last-level
page table mapped, and should unmap it at exit.
This is a rather minimally invasive patch to solve the problem of the
user stack growing into a memory mapped area below it. Whenever we fill
the first page of the stack segment, expand the segment down by one
page.
Now, admittedly some odd application might _want_ the stack to grow down
into the preceding memory mapping, and so we may at some point need to
make this a process tunable (some people might also want to have more
than a single page of guarding), but let's try the minimal approach
first.
Tested with trivial application that maps a single page just below the
stack, and then starts recursing. Without this, we will get a SIGSEGV
_after_ the stack has smashed the mapping. With this patch, we'll get a
nice SIGBUS just as the stack touches the page just above the mapping.
Devices which share the same queue, like floppies and mtd devices, get
registered multiple times in the bdi interface, but bdi accounts only the
last registered device of the devices sharing one queue.
On remove, all earlier registered devices leak, stay around in sysfs, and
cause "duplicate filename" errors if the devices are re-created.
This prevents the creation of multiple bdi interfaces per queue, and the
bdi device will carry the dev_t name of the block device which is the
first one registered, of the pool of devices using the same queue.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add a WARN_ON so we know which drivers are misbehaving] Tested-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
xen_sched_clock only counts unstolen time. In principle this should
be useful to the Linux scheduler so that it knows how much time a process
actually consumed. But in practice this doesn't work very well as the
scheduler expects the sched_clock time to be synchronized between
cpus. It also uses sched_clock to measure the time a task spends
sleeping, in which case "unstolen time" isn't meaningful.
So just use plain xen_clocksource_read to return wallclock nanoseconds
for sched_clock.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
It's currently possible to bypass xattr namespace access rules by
prefixing valid xattr names with "os2.", since the os2 namespace stores
extended attributes in a legacy format with no prefix.
This patch adds checking to deny access to any valid namespace prefix
following "os2.".
If signalfd is used to consume a signal generated by a POSIX interval
timer or POSIX message queue, the ssi_int field does not reflect the data
(sigevent->sigev_value) supplied to timer_create(2) or mq_notify(3). (The
ssi_ptr field, however, is filled in.)
This behavior differs from signalfd's treatment of sigqueue-generated
signals -- see the default case in signalfd_copyinfo. It also gives
results that differ from the case when a signal is handled conventionally
via a sigaction-registered handler.
So, set signalfd_siginfo->ssi_int in the remaining cases (__SI_TIMER,
__SI_MESGQ) where ssi_ptr is set.
akpm: a non-back-compatible change. Merge into -stable to minimise the
number of kernels which are in the field and which miss this feature.
Lower filesystems that only implemented unlocked_ioctl weren't being
passed ioctl calls because eCryptfs only checked for
lower_file->f_op->ioctl and returned -ENOTTY if it was NULL.
eCryptfs shouldn't implement ioctl(), since it doesn't require the BKL.
This patch introduces ecryptfs_unlocked_ioctl() and
ecryptfs_compat_ioctl(), which passes the calls on to the lower file
system.
If the 'bio_split' path in raid10-read is used while
resync/recovery is happening it is possible to deadlock.
Fix this be elevating ->nr_waiting for the duration of both
parts of the split request.
This fixes a bug that has been present since 2.6.22
but has only started manifesting recently for unknown reasons.
It is suitable for and -stable since then.
MSI delivery from on-board ahci controller doesn't work on K8M800. At
this point, it's unclear whether the culprit is with the ahci
controller or the host bridge. Given the track record and considering
the rather minimal impact of MSI, disabling it seems reasonable.
SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK is clearly documented to only affect blocking on the
pipe. In __generic_file_splice_read(), however, it causes an EAGAIN
if the page is currently being read.
This makes it impossible to write an application that only wants
failure if the pipe is full. For example if the same process is
handling both ends of a pipe and isn't otherwise able to determine
whether a splice to the pipe will fill it or not.
We could make the read non-blocking on O_NONBLOCK or some other splice
flag, but for now this is the simplest fix.
In nvram_write, first of all, correctly handle the case where the file
pointer is already beyond the end; we should return EOF in that case.
Second, make the logic a bit more explicit so that gcc can statically
prove that the copy_from_user() is safe. Once the condition of the
beyond-end filepointer is eliminated, the copy is safe but gcc can't
prove it, causing build failures for i386 allyesconfig.
Third, eliminate the entirely superfluous variable "len", and just use
the passed-in variable "count" instead.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <tip-*@git.kernel.org> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch fixes a kernel Oops in the GFS2 rename code.
The problem was in the way the gfs2 directory code was trying
to re-use sentinel directory entries.
In the failing case, gfs2's rename function was renaming a
file to another name that had the same non-trivial length.
The file being renamed happened to be the first directory
entry on the leaf block.
First, the rename code (gfs2_rename in ops_inode.c) found the
original directory entry and decided it could do its job by
simply replacing the directory entry with another. Therefore
it determined correctly that no block allocations were needed.
Next, the rename code deleted the old directory entry prior to
replacing it with the new name. Therefore, the soon-to-be
replaced directory entry was temporarily made into a directory
entry "sentinel" or a place holder at the start of a leaf block.
Lastly, it went to re-add the replacement directory entry in
that leaf block. However, when gfs2_dirent_find_space was
looking for space in the leaf block, it used the wrong value
for the sentinel. That threw off its calculations so later
it decides it can't really re-use the sentinel and therefore
must allocate a new leaf block. But because it previously decided
to re-use the directory entry, it didn't waste the time to
grab a new block allocation for the inode. Therefore, the
inode's i_alloc pointer was still NULL and it crashes trying to
reference it.
In the case of sentinel directory entries, the entire dirent is
reused, not just the "free space" portion of it, and therefore
the function gfs2_dirent_find_space should use the value 0
rather than GFS2_DIRENT_SIZE(0) for the actual dirent size.
Fixing this calculation enables the reproducer programs to work
properly.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This patch prevents user "foo" from using the SWAPEXT ioctl to swap
a write-only file owned by user "bar" into a file owned by "foo" and
subsequently reading it. It does so by checking that the file
descriptors passed to the ioctl are also opened for reading.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The function ecryptfs_uid_hash wrongly assumes that the
second parameter to hash_long() is the number of hash
buckets instead of the number of hash bits.
This patch fixes that and renames the variable
ecryptfs_hash_buckets to ecryptfs_hash_bits to make it
clearer.
> program: /home/alan/GitTrees/linux-2.6-mid-ref/scripts/mod/modpost -o
> Module.symvers -S vmlinux.o
>
> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
It just hit me.
It's the offset calculation in reloc_location() which overflows:
return (void *)elf->hdr + sechdrs[section].sh_offset +
(r->r_offset - sechdrs[section].sh_addr);
E.g. for the first rodata r entry:
r->r_offset < sechdrs[section].sh_addr
and the expression in the parenthesis produces 0xFFFFFFE0 or something
equally wise.
Reported-by: Alan <alan@clueserver.org> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Hałasa <khc@pm.waw.pl> Tested-by: Alan <alan@clueserver.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
I've hit an issue on my system when I've been using RealTek RTL8139D cards in
bonding interface in mode balancing-alb. When I enslave a card, the current
active slave (bond->curr_active_slave) is not set and the link is therefore
not functional.
Bonding Mode: adaptive load balancing
Primary Slave: None
Currently Active Slave: None
MII Status: up
MII Polling Interval (ms): 100
Up Delay (ms): 0
Down Delay (ms): 0
Slave Interface: eth1
MII Status: up
Link Failure Count: 0
Permanent HW addr: 00:1f:1f:01:2f:22
----
The thing that gets it right is when I unplug the cable and then I put it back
into the NIC. Then the current active slave is set to eth1 and link is working
just fine. Here is dmesg log with bonding DEBUG messages turned on:
----
ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): bond0: link is not ready
event_dev: bond0, event: 1
IFF_MASTER
event_dev: bond0, event: 8
IFF_MASTER
bond_ioctl: master=bond0, cmd=35216
slave_dev=cac5d800:
slave_dev->name=eth1:
eth1: ! NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED
event_dev: eth1, event: 8
eth1: link up, 100Mbps, full-duplex, lpa 0xC5E1
event_dev: eth1, event: 1
event_dev: eth1, event: 8
IFF_SLAVE
Initial state of slave_dev is BOND_LINK_UP
bonding: bond0: enslaving eth1 as an active interface with an up link.
ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): bond0: link becomes ready
event_dev: bond0, event: 4
IFF_MASTER
bond0: no IPv6 routers present
<<<<cable unplug>>>>
eth1: link down
event_dev: eth1, event: 4
IFF_SLAVE
bonding: bond0: link status definitely down for interface eth1, disabling it
event_dev: bond0, event: 4
IFF_MASTER
<<<<cable plug>>>>
eth1: link up, 100Mbps, full-duplex, lpa 0xC5E1
event_dev: eth1, event: 4
IFF_SLAVE
bonding: bond0: link status definitely up for interface eth1.
bonding: bond0: making interface eth1 the new active one.
event_dev: eth1, event: 8
IFF_SLAVE
event_dev: eth1, event: 8
IFF_SLAVE
bonding: bond0: first active interface up!
event_dev: bond0, event: 4
IFF_MASTER
----
The current active slave is set by calling bond_select_active_slave() function
from bond_miimon_commit() function when the slave (eth1) link goes to state up.
I also tested this on other machine with Broadcom NetXtreme II BCM5708
1000Base-T NIC and there all works fine. The thing is that this adapter is down
and goes up after few seconds after it is enslaved.
This patch calls bond_select_active_slave() in bond_enslave() function for modes
alb and tlb and makes sure that the current active slave is set up properly even
when the slave state is already up. Tested on both systems, works fine.
Notice: The same problem can maybe also occrur in mode 8023AD but I'm unable to
test that.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Sumeet Lahorani <sumeet.lahorani@oracle.com> reported that the IPoIB
child entries are world-writable; however we don't want ordinary users
to be able to create and destroy child interfaces, so fix them to be
writable only by root.
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@voltaire.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The x3950 family can have as many as 256 PCI buses in a single system, so
change the limits to the maximum. Since there can only be 256 PCI buses in one
domain, we no longer need the BUG_ON check.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20100701004519.GQ15515@tux1.beaverton.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Newer systems (x3950M2) can have 48 PHBs per chassis and 8
chassis, so bump the limits up and provide an explanation
of the requirements for each class.
The current initialisation code probes 'unsupported' AGP devices
simply by calling its own probe function. It does not lock these
devices or even check whether another driver is already bound to
them.
We must use the device core to manage this. So if the specific
device id table didn't match anything and agp_try_unsupported=1,
switch the device id table and call driver_attach() again.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Use an irq spinlock to hold off the IRQ handler until
enough early card init is complete such that the handler
can run without faulting.
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The kernel's math-emu code contains a macro _FP_FROM_INT() which is
used to convert an integer to a raw normalized floating-point value.
It does this basically in three steps:
1. Compute the exponent from the number of leading zero bits.
2. Downshift large fractions to put the MSB in the right position
for normalized fractions.
3. Upshift small fractions to put the MSB in the right position.
There is an boundary error in step 2, causing a fraction with its
MSB exactly one bit above the normalized MSB position to not be
downshifted. This results in a non-normalized raw float, which when
packed becomes a massively inaccurate representation for that input.
The impact of this depends on a number of arch-specific factors,
but it is known to have broken emulation of FXTOD instructions
on UltraSPARC III, which was originally reported as GCC bug 44631
<http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=44631>.
Any arch which uses math-emu to emulate conversions from integers to
same-size floats may be affected.
The fix is simple: the exponent comparison used to determine if the
fraction should be downshifted must be "<=" not "<".
I'm sending a kernel module to test this as a reply to this message.
There are also SPARC user-space test cases in the GCC bug entry.
Signed-off-by: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
sky2_phy_reinit is called by the ethtool helpers sky2_set_settings,
sky2_nway_reset and sky2_set_pauseparam when netif_running.
However, at the end of sky2_phy_init GM_GP_CTRL has GM_GPCR_RX_ENA and
GM_GPCR_TX_ENA cleared. So, doing these commands causes the device to
stop working:
$ ethtool -r eth0
$ ethtool -A eth0 autoneg off
Fix this issue by enabling Rx/Tx after running sky2_phy_init in
sky2_phy_reinit.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de> Tested-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Tested-by: Mike McCormack <mikem@ring3k.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
If the call to phy_connect fails, we will return directly instead of freeing
the previously allocated struct net_device.
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
While chasing a bug report involving a OS/2 server, I noticed the server sets
pSMBr->CountHigh to a incorrect value even in case of normal writes. This
results in 'nbytes' being computed wrongly and triggers a kernel BUG at
mm/filemap.c.
Why the server is setting 'CountHigh' is not clear but only does so after
writing 64k bytes. Though this looks like the server bug, the client side
crash may not be acceptable.
The workaround is to mask off high 16 bits if the number of bytes written as
returned by the server is greater than the bytes requested by the client as
suggested by Jeff Layton.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This bug appears to be the result of a cut-and-paste mistake from the
NTLMv1 code. The function to generate the MAC key was commented out, but
not the conditional above it. The conditional then ended up causing the
session setup key not to be copied to the buffer unless this was the
first session on the socket, and that made all but the first NTLMv2
session setup fail.
Fix this by removing the conditional and all of the commented clutter
that made it difficult to see.
find_keyring_by_name() can gain access to a keyring that has had its reference
count reduced to zero, and is thus ready to be freed. This then allows the
dead keyring to be brought back into use whilst it is being destroyed.
This problem is that find_keyring_by_name does not confirm that the keyring is
valid before accepting it.
Skipping keyrings that have been reduced to a zero count seems the way to go.
To this end, use atomic_inc_not_zero() to increment the usage count and skip
the candidate keyring if that returns false.
The following script _may_ cause the bug to happen, but there's no guarantee
as the window of opportunity is small:
Clear the floating point exception flag before returning to
user space. This is needed, else the libc trampoline handler
may hit the same SIGFPE again while building up a trampoline
to a signal handler.
What happens is that, when the tipc module in inserted it enters a standalone
node mode in which communication to its own address is allowed <0.0.0> but not
to other addresses, since the appropriate data structures have not been
allocated yet (specifically the tipc_net pointer). There is nothing stopping a
client from trying to send such a message however, and if that happens, we
attempt to dereference tipc_net.zones while the pointer is still NULL, and
explode. The fix is pretty straightforward. Since these oopses all arise from
the dereference of global pointers prior to their assignment to allocated
values, and since these allocations are small (about 2k total), lets convert
these pointers to static arrays of the appropriate size. All the accesses to
these bits consider 0/NULL to be a non match when searching, so all the lookups
still work properly, and there is no longer a chance of a bad dererence
anywhere. As a bonus, this lets us eliminate the setup/teardown routines for
those pointers, and elimnates the need to preform any locking around them to
prevent access while their being allocated/freed.
I've updated the tipc_net structure to behave this way to fix the exact reported
problem, and also fixed up the tipc_bearers and media_list arrays to fix an
obvious simmilar problem that arises from issuing tipc-config commands to
manipulate bearers/links prior to entering networked mode
I've tested this for a few hours by running the sanity tests and stress test
with the tipcutils suite, and nothing has fallen over. There have been a few
lockdep warnings, but those were there before, and can be addressed later, as
they didn't actually result in any deadlock.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: tipc-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Add a new UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2). This is needed to prevent
symlink attacks in unprivileged unmounts (fuse, samba, ncpfs).
Additionally, return -EINVAL if an unknown flag is used (and specify
an explicitly unused flag: UMOUNT_UNUSED). This makes it possible for
the caller to determine if a flag is supported or not.
CC: Eugene Teo <eugene@redhat.com> CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Its an skb_over_panic BUG halt that results from processing an init chunk in
which too many of its variable length parameters are in some way malformed.
The problem is in sctp_process_unk_param:
if (NULL == *errp)
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
if (*errp) {
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
param.v);
When we allocate an error chunk, we assume that the worst case scenario requires
that we have chunk_hdr->length data allocated, which would be correct nominally,
given that we call sctp_addto_chunk for the violating parameter. Unfortunately,
we also, in sctp_init_cause insert a sctp_errhdr_t structure into the error
chunk, so the worst case situation in which all parameters are in violation
requires chunk_hdr->length+(sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t)*param_count) bytes of data.
The result of this error is that a deliberately malformed packet sent to a
listening host can cause a remote DOS, described in CVE-2010-1173:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2010-1173
I've tested the below fix and confirmed that it fixes the issue. We move to a
strategy whereby we allocate a fixed size error chunk and ignore errors we don't
have space to report. Tested by me successfully
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
With delayed allocation we lock the page in write_cache_pages() and
try to build an in memory extent of contiguous blocks. This is needed
so that we can get large contiguous blocks request. If range_cyclic
mode is enabled, write_cache_pages() will loop back to the 0 index if
no I/O has been done yet, and try to start writing from the beginning
of the range. That causes an attempt to take the page lock of lower
index page while holding the page lock of higher index page, which can
cause a dead lock with another writeback thread.
The solution is to implement the range_cyclic behavior in
ext4_da_writepages() instead.
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12579
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Jayson R. King <dev@jaysonking.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
The range_cyclic writeback mode uses the address_space writeback_index
as the start index for writeback. With delayed allocation we were
updating writeback_index wrongly resulting in highly fragmented file.
This patch reduces the number of extents reduced from 4000 to 27 for a
3GB file.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[dev@jaysonking.com: Some changed lines from the original version of this patch were dropped, since they were rolled up with another cherry-picked patch applied to 2.6.27.y earlier.]
[dev@jaysonking.com: Use of wbc->no_nrwrite_index_update was dropped, since write_cache_pages_da() implies it.] Signed-off-by: Jayson R. King <dev@jaysonking.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Make a copy of write_cache_pages() for the benefit of
ext4_da_writepages(). This allows us to simplify the code some, and
will allow us to further customize the code in future patches.
There are some nasty hacks in write_cache_pages(), which Linus has
(correctly) characterized as vile. I've just copied it into
write_cache_pages_da(), without trying to clean those bits up lest I
break something in the ext4's delalloc implementation, which is a bit
fragile right now. This will allow Dave Chinner to clean up
write_cache_pages() in mm/page-writeback.c, without worrying about
breaking ext4. Eventually write_cache_pages_da() will go away when I
rewrite ext4's delayed allocation and create a general
ext4_writepages() which is used for all of ext4's writeback. Until
now this is the lowest risk way to clean up the core
write_cache_pages() function.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
[dev@jaysonking.com: Dropped the hunks which reverted the use of no_nrwrite_index_update, since those lines weren't ever created on 2.6.27.y]
[dev@jaysonking.com: Copied from 2.6.27.y's version of write_cache_pages(), plus the changes to it from patch "vfs: Add no_nrwrite_index_update writeback control flag"] Signed-off-by: Jayson R. King <dev@jaysonking.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
If groups_per_flex < 2, sbi->s_flex_groups[] doesn't get filled out,
and every other access to this first tests s_log_groups_per_flex;
same thing needs to happen in resize or we'll wander off into
a null pointer when doing an online resize of the file system.
Thanks to Christoph Biedl, who came up with the trivial testcase:
Making gconfig fails on fedora 13 as the linker cannot resolve dlsym.
Adding libdl to the link command fixes this.
make shows this error :-
/usr/bin/ld: scripts/kconfig/kconfig_load.o: undefined reference to symbol 'dlsym@@GLIBC_2.2.5'
/usr/bin/ld: note: 'dlsym@@GLIBC_2.2.5' is defined in DSO /lib64/libdl.so.2 so try adding it to the linker command line
/lib64/libdl.so.2: could not read symbols: Invalid operation
tested on x86_64 fedora 13.
Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk> Reviewed-by: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
I/O errors can happen due to temporary failures, like multipath
errors or losing network contact with the iSCSI server. Because
of that, the VM will retry readpage on the page.
However, do_generic_file_read does not clear PG_error. This
causes the system to be unable to actually use the data in the
page cache page, even if the subsequent readpage completes
successfully!
The function filemap_fault has had a ClearPageError before
readpage forever. This patch simply adds the same to
do_generic_file_read.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
When the user sets the block device to readwrite then the mddev should
follow suit. Otherwise, the BUG_ON in md_write_start() will be set to
trigger.
The reverse direction, setting mddev->ro to match a set readonly
request, can be ignored because the blkdev level readonly flag precludes
the need to have mddev->ro set correctly. Nevermind the fact that
setting mddev->ro to 1 may fail if the array is in use.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
read_balance uses a "unsigned long" for a sector number which
will get truncated beyond 2TB.
This will cause read-balancing to be non-optimal, and can cause
data to be read from the 'wrong' branch during a resync. This has a
very small chance of returning wrong data.
Reported-by: Jordan Russell <jr-list-2010@quo.to> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
There is a very small race window when writing to a
RAID1 such that if a device is marked faulty at exactly the wrong
time, the write-in-progress will not be sent to the device,
but the bitmap (if present) will be updated to say that
the write was sent.
Then if the device turned out to still be usable as was re-added
to the array, the bitmap-based-resync would skip resyncing that
block, possibly leading to corruption. This would only be a problem
if no further writes were issued to that area of the device (i.e.
that bitmap chunk).
projects / karo-tx-linux.git / log