sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]

[ Upstream commit 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 ]

Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c
index 602cd637182ebb321af6773d2ccfe9a8945d44c5..750f44f3aa3117b578af1377ff07abb79032a612 100644 (file)
--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
        if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
        if (hndl == NULL)
                err = -ENOENT;