2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2190 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2192 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2201 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2202 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2203 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2204 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2206 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2209 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2212 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2213 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2215 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2216 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2217 struct files_struct *files)
2219 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2220 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2221 struct tty_struct *tty;
2222 struct fdtable *fdt;
2226 tty = get_current_tty();
2229 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2230 struct inode *inode;
2232 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2233 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2234 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2235 file may belong to another process and we are only
2236 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2237 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2238 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2239 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2240 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2247 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2251 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2253 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2255 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2257 unsigned long set, i;
2262 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2263 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2265 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2268 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2269 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2274 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2276 file_to_av(file))) {
2278 fd = get_unused_fd();
2288 devnull = dentry_open(
2290 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2292 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2299 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2304 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2307 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2311 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2313 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2315 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2316 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2319 secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
2321 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2322 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2325 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2326 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2328 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2329 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2331 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2332 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2333 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2335 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2336 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2337 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2338 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2339 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2342 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2344 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2345 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2346 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2347 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2349 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2354 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2357 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2359 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2360 struct itimerval itimer;
2361 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2364 unsigned long flags;
2366 secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
2374 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2375 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2376 * flush and unblock signals.
2378 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2379 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2381 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2383 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2384 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2385 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2386 flush_signals(current);
2387 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2388 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2389 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2390 recalc_sigpending();
2391 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2394 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2395 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2396 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2397 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2398 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2399 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2400 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2401 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2404 /* superblock security operations */
2406 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2408 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2411 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2413 superblock_free_security(sb);
2416 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2421 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2424 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2426 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2427 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2428 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2429 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2430 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2433 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2440 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2444 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2447 int current_size = 0;
2455 while (current_size < len) {
2465 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2467 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2468 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2469 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2475 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2483 in_save = in_end = orig;
2487 open_quote = !open_quote;
2488 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2490 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2492 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2493 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2495 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2497 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2499 } while (*in_end++);
2501 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2502 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2507 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2509 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2510 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2513 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2517 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2518 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2521 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2522 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2523 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2526 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2528 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2529 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2531 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2532 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2533 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2536 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2539 unsigned long flags,
2542 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2545 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2549 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2550 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2551 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2553 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2557 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2559 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2562 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2566 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2567 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2570 /* inode security operations */
2572 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2574 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2577 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2579 inode_free_security(inode);
2582 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2583 char **name, void **value,
2586 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2587 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2588 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2589 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2590 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2592 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2594 dsec = dir->i_security;
2595 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2598 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2600 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2601 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2602 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2605 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2606 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2609 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2614 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2615 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2616 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2617 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2619 isec->initialized = 1;
2622 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2626 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2633 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2645 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2647 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2650 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2654 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2657 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2660 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2664 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2667 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2670 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2672 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2675 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2677 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2680 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2682 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2685 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2689 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2693 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2696 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2697 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2699 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2702 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2704 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2706 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2709 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2711 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2714 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2717 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2720 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2722 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2725 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2730 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2734 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2735 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2738 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2740 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2743 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2747 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2750 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2751 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2752 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2754 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2757 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2759 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2761 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2764 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2766 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2768 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2769 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2770 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2771 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2773 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2774 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2775 Restrict to administrator. */
2780 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2781 ordinary setattr permission. */
2782 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2785 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2786 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2788 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2789 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2790 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2791 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2792 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2795 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2796 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2798 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2799 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2802 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2805 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2806 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2808 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2809 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2813 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2814 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2815 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2817 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2822 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2823 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2827 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2832 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2834 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2835 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2839 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2840 const void *value, size_t size,
2843 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2844 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2848 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2849 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2853 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2855 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2856 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2857 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2865 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2867 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2869 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2872 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2874 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2876 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2879 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2881 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2882 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2884 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2885 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2890 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2892 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2894 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2898 char *context = NULL;
2899 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2901 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2905 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2906 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2907 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2908 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2909 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2910 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2911 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2913 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2914 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2916 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2919 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2932 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2933 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2935 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2939 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2942 if (!value || !size)
2945 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2953 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2955 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2956 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2957 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2961 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2963 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2966 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2968 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2971 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2973 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2977 /* file security operations */
2979 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2981 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2983 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2986 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2990 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2991 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2994 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2995 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2999 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
3002 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3004 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3005 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3006 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3007 u32 sid = current_sid();
3010 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3014 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
3015 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3016 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
3018 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3021 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3023 return file_alloc_security(file);
3026 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3028 file_free_security(file);
3031 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3034 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3037 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3039 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3044 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3047 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3049 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3052 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3053 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3055 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3056 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3057 * This has an additional check.
3059 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3066 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3067 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3069 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3070 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3073 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3074 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3076 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3083 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3084 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3085 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3088 u32 sid = current_sid();
3090 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3091 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3092 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3093 if (rc || addr_only)
3096 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3099 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3100 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3103 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3104 unsigned long reqprot,
3107 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3110 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3114 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3117 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3118 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3120 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3121 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3122 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3123 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3124 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3125 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3126 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3127 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3129 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3130 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3131 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3132 * modified content. This typically should only
3133 * occur for text relocations.
3135 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3142 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3145 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3147 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3149 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3152 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3155 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3160 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3165 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3166 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3175 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3176 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3181 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3186 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3190 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3197 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3199 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3201 fsec = file->f_security;
3202 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3207 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3208 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3211 u32 sid = current_sid();
3213 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3215 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3216 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3218 fsec = file->f_security;
3221 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3223 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3225 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3226 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3229 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3231 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3233 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3236 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3238 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3239 struct inode *inode;
3240 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3242 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3243 fsec = file->f_security;
3244 isec = inode->i_security;
3246 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3247 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3248 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3249 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3250 * struct as its SID.
3252 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3253 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3255 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3256 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3257 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3258 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3259 * new inode label or new policy.
3260 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3262 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3265 /* task security operations */
3267 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3271 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3275 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3279 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3281 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3283 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3284 cred->security = NULL;
3289 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3291 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3294 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3295 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3297 old_tsec = old->security;
3299 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3303 new->security = tsec;
3308 * commit new credentials
3310 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3312 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3316 * set the security data for a kernel service
3317 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3319 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3321 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3322 u32 sid = current_sid();
3325 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3326 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3327 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3331 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3332 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3333 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3339 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3340 * objective context of the specified inode
3342 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3344 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3345 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3346 u32 sid = current_sid();
3349 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3350 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3351 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3355 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3359 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3361 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3362 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3363 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3364 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3365 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3370 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3373 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3376 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3378 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3382 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3384 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3387 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3389 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3392 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3394 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3397 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3399 *secid = task_sid(p);
3402 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3404 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3408 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3412 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3416 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3419 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3423 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3427 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3430 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3432 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3435 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3437 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3440 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3444 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3445 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3446 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3447 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3448 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3449 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3454 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3458 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3462 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3465 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3467 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3470 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3472 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3475 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3481 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3486 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3488 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3490 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3491 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3493 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3497 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3503 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3504 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3505 the state of the current process. */
3506 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3509 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3511 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3514 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3515 struct inode *inode)
3517 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3518 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3521 isec->initialized = 1;
3524 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3525 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3526 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3528 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3529 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3531 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3532 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3536 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3537 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3540 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3541 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3545 *proto = ih->protocol;
3547 switch (ih->protocol) {
3549 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3551 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3555 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3559 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3560 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3565 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3567 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3571 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3575 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3576 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3580 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3581 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3583 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3587 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3591 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3592 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3603 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3605 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3606 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3607 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3610 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3611 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3613 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3614 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3618 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3619 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3622 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3623 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3624 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3633 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3635 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3639 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3640 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3645 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3647 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3651 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3652 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3656 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3657 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3659 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3663 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3664 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3668 /* includes fragments */
3678 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3679 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3684 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3686 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3689 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3690 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3693 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3695 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3698 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3699 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3709 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3710 " unable to parse packet\n");
3720 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3722 * @family: protocol family
3723 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3726 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3727 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3728 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3729 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3730 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3734 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3741 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3742 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3744 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3745 if (unlikely(err)) {
3747 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3748 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3755 /* socket security operations */
3756 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3759 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3760 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3764 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3766 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3768 sid = task_sid(task);
3770 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3771 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3772 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3778 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3779 int protocol, int kern)
3781 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3782 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3791 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3793 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3794 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3800 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3801 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3803 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3804 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3806 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3811 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3813 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3816 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3822 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3823 isec->initialized = 1;
3826 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3827 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3828 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3829 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3835 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3836 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3837 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3839 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3844 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3849 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3850 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3851 * check the first address now.
3853 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3854 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3856 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3857 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3858 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3859 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3860 unsigned short snum;
3861 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3864 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3866 if (family == PF_INET) {
3867 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3868 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3869 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3871 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3872 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3873 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3879 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3881 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3882 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3886 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3887 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3888 ad.u.net.family = family;
3889 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3891 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3897 switch (isec->sclass) {
3898 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3899 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3902 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3903 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3906 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3907 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3911 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3915 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3919 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3920 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3921 ad.u.net.family = family;
3923 if (family == PF_INET)
3924 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3926 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3928 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3929 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3937 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3939 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3940 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3943 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3948 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3950 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3951 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3952 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3953 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3954 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3955 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3956 unsigned short snum;
3959 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3960 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3961 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3963 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3965 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3966 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3968 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3971 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3975 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3976 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3978 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3979 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3980 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3981 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3986 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3992 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3994 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3997 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4000 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4001 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4003 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4007 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4009 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4010 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4011 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4012 newisec->initialized = 1;
4017 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4022 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
4026 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
4029 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4030 int size, int flags)
4032 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
4035 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4037 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4040 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4042 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4045 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4049 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4053 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4056 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4059 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4062 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4064 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4067 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4068 struct socket *other,
4071 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4072 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4073 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4074 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4077 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4081 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4082 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4084 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4085 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4087 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4089 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4093 /* connecting socket */
4094 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4095 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4097 /* server child socket */
4098 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4099 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4100 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4105 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4106 struct socket *other)
4108 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4109 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4110 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4113 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4114 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4116 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4117 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4119 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4120 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4127 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4129 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4135 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4138 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4139 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4143 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4146 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4147 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4150 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4151 struct sk_buff *skb,
4152 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4157 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4159 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4160 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4162 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4163 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4166 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4167 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4168 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4169 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4171 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4172 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4173 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4174 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4176 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4177 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4178 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4179 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4182 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4183 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4188 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4191 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4195 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4198 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4204 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4205 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4206 if (unlikely(err)) {
4208 "SELinux: failure in"
4209 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4210 " network port label not found\n");
4213 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4216 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4220 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4222 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4223 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4226 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4227 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4228 ad.u.net.family = family;
4229 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4233 if (selinux_compat_net)
4234 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4236 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4237 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4242 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4243 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4246 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4247 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4249 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4251 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4254 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4260 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4263 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4264 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4265 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4266 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4271 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4274 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4275 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4278 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4279 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4280 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4281 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4282 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4283 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4285 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4286 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4287 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4290 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4291 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4292 ad.u.net.family = family;
4293 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4297 if (peerlbl_active) {
4300 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4303 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4306 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4309 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4312 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4315 if (secmark_active) {
4316 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4325 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4326 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4331 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4332 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4333 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4335 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4337 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4338 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4339 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4340 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4342 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4347 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4352 if (scontext_len > len) {
4357 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4361 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4369 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4371 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4374 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4376 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4379 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4383 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4384 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4386 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4389 *secid = peer_secid;
4390 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4395 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4397 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4400 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4402 sk_free_security(sk);
4405 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4407 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4408 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4410 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4411 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4412 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4414 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4417 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4420 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4422 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4424 *secid = sksec->sid;
4428 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4430 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4431 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4433 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4434 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4435 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4436 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4439 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4440 struct request_sock *req)
4442 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4444 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4448 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4449 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4452 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4455 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4456 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4457 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4461 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4465 req->secid = newsid;
4466 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4470 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4471 const struct request_sock *req)
4473 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4475 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4476 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4477 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4478 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4479 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4480 time it will have been created and available. */
4482 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4483 * thread with access to newsksec */
4484 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4487 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4489 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4490 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4492 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4493 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4496 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4498 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4501 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4504 fl->secid = req->secid;
4507 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4511 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4512 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4513 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4515 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4519 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4521 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4523 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4524 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4525 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4526 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4527 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4528 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4538 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4543 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4545 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4551 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4556 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4559 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4560 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4561 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4562 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4565 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4568 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4569 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4570 ad.u.net.family = family;
4571 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4574 if (peerlbl_active) {
4575 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4578 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4584 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4585 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4589 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4590 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4591 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4593 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4599 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4600 struct sk_buff *skb,
4601 const struct net_device *in,
4602 const struct net_device *out,
4603 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4605 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4608 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4609 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4610 struct sk_buff *skb,
4611 const struct net_device *in,
4612 const struct net_device *out,
4613 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4615 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4619 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4624 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4627 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4628 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4629 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4631 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4634 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4635 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4641 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4642 struct sk_buff *skb,
4643 const struct net_device *in,
4644 const struct net_device *out,
4645 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4647 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4650 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4652 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4653 u16 family, char *addrp)
4656 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4658 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4659 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4661 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4662 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4665 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4666 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4667 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4668 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4670 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4671 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4672 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4673 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4675 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4676 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4677 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4678 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4681 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4682 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4687 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4690 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4693 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4696 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4703 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4704 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4705 if (unlikely(err)) {
4707 "SELinux: failure in"
4708 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4709 " network port label not found\n");
4712 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4715 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4719 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4720 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4721 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4727 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4729 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4730 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4731 ad.u.net.family = family;
4732 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4735 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4736 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4737 &ad, family, addrp))
4739 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4740 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4741 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4745 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4746 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4752 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4758 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4763 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4764 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4765 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4766 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4767 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4768 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4770 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4771 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4772 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4773 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4774 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4775 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4776 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4779 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4780 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4781 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4784 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4785 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4786 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4787 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4792 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4793 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4795 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4798 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4799 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4801 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4806 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4807 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4810 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4812 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4813 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4814 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4817 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4818 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4819 ad.u.net.family = family;
4820 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4824 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4825 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4828 if (peerlbl_active) {
4832 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4834 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4835 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4838 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4840 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4841 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4848 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4849 struct sk_buff *skb,
4850 const struct net_device *in,
4851 const struct net_device *out,
4852 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4854 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4857 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4858 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4859 struct sk_buff *skb,
4860 const struct net_device *in,
4861 const struct net_device *out,
4862 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4864 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4868 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4870 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4874 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4878 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4879 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4884 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4887 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4889 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4893 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4894 ad.u.cap = capability;
4896 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4897 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4900 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4901 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4904 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4907 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4911 sid = task_sid(task);
4912 isec->sclass = sclass;
4914 perm->security = isec;
4919 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4921 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4922 perm->security = NULL;
4926 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4928 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4930 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4934 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4935 msg->security = msec;
4940 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4942 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4944 msg->security = NULL;
4948 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4951 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4952 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4953 u32 sid = current_sid();
4955 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4957 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4958 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4960 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4963 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4965 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4968 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4970 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4973 /* message queue security operations */
4974 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4976 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4977 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4978 u32 sid = current_sid();
4981 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4985 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4987 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4988 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4990 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4993 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4999 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5001 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5004 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5006 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5007 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5008 u32 sid = current_sid();
5010 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5012 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5013 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5015 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5016 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5019 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5027 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5028 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5031 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5034 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5037 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5043 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5047 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5049 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5050 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5051 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5052 u32 sid = current_sid();
5055 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5056 msec = msg->security;
5059 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5061 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5063 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5064 * message queue this message will be stored in
5066 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5072 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5073 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5075 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5076 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5079 /* Can this process send the message */
5080 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5083 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5084 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5085 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5090 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5091 struct task_struct *target,
5092 long type, int mode)
5094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5095 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5096 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5097 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5100 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5101 msec = msg->security;
5103 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5104 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5106 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5107 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5109 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5110 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5114 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5115 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5117 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5118 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5119 u32 sid = current_sid();
5122 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5126 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5128 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5129 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5131 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5134 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5140 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5142 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5145 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5147 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5148 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5149 u32 sid = current_sid();
5151 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5153 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5154 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5156 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5157 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5160 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5161 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5169 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5170 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5173 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5176 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5183 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5189 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5193 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5194 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5199 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5203 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5206 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5208 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5211 /* Semaphore security operations */
5212 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5214 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5215 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5216 u32 sid = current_sid();
5219 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5223 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5225 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5226 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5228 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5231 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5237 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5239 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5242 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5244 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5245 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5246 u32 sid = current_sid();
5248 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5250 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5251 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5253 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5254 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5257 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5258 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5266 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5267 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5271 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5282 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5285 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5289 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5295 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5299 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5300 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5305 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5309 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5312 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5318 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5320 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5325 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5328 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5330 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5334 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5337 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5340 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5341 char *name, char **value)
5343 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5349 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5355 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5357 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5359 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5361 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5362 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5363 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5364 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5365 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5366 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5367 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5368 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5376 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5386 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5387 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5389 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5390 struct task_struct *tracer;
5397 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5398 security attributes. */
5403 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5404 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5405 * above restriction is ever removed.
5407 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5408 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5409 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5410 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5411 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5412 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5413 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5414 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5415 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5416 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5422 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5423 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5424 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5428 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5429 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5430 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5432 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5439 new = prepare_creds();
5443 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5444 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5445 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5446 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5447 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5448 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5449 tsec = new->security;
5450 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5451 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5452 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5453 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5454 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5455 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5458 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5459 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5460 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5461 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5466 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5468 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5469 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5474 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5475 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5476 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5480 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5481 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5484 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5486 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5490 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5491 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5510 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5512 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5515 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5517 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5520 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5527 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5528 unsigned long flags)
5530 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5531 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5533 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5537 tsec = cred->security;
5538 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5539 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5541 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5547 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5549 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5555 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5556 const struct cred *cred,
5560 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5563 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5564 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5565 appear to be created. */
5569 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5571 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5572 ksec = key->security;
5574 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5577 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5579 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5580 char *context = NULL;
5584 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5593 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5596 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5597 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5598 .capget = selinux_capget,
5599 .capset = selinux_capset,
5600 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5601 .capable = selinux_capable,
5602 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5603 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5604 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5605 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5607 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5608 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5610 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5611 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5612 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5613 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5614 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5616 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5617 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5618 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5619 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5620 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5621 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5622 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5623 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5624 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5625 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5626 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5629 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5630 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5631 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5632 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5633 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5634 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5635 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5636 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5637 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5638 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5639 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5640 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5641 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5642 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5643 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5644 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5645 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5646 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5647 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5648 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5649 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5650 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5651 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5652 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5653 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5654 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5655 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5657 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5658 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5659 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5660 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5661 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5662 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5663 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5664 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5665 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5666 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5667 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5669 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5671 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5672 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5673 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5674 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5675 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5676 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5677 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5678 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5679 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5680 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5681 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5682 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5683 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5684 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5685 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5686 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5687 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5688 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5689 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5690 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5691 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5692 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5693 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5694 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5695 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5697 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5698 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5700 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5701 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5703 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5704 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5705 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5706 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5707 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5708 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5710 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5711 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5712 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5713 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5714 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5716 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5717 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5718 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5719 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5720 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5722 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5724 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5725 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5727 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5728 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5729 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5731 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5732 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5734 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5735 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5736 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5737 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5738 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5739 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5740 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5741 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5742 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5743 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5744 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5745 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5746 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5747 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5748 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5749 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5750 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5751 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5752 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5753 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5754 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5755 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5756 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5757 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5758 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5760 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5761 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5762 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5763 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5764 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5765 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5766 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5767 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5768 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5769 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5770 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5774 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5775 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5776 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5777 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5781 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5782 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5783 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5784 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5788 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5790 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5791 selinux_enabled = 0;
5795 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5796 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5800 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5802 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5803 cred_init_security();
5805 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5806 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5807 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5810 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5812 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5813 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5814 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5816 if (selinux_enforcing)
5817 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5819 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5824 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5826 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5828 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5829 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5830 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5831 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5833 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5834 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5835 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5836 struct superblock_security_struct,
5838 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5840 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5841 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5842 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5844 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5846 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5847 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5848 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5851 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5852 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5855 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5856 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5857 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5859 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5861 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5863 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5864 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5866 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5867 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5870 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5871 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5873 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5874 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5877 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5878 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5880 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5881 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5885 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5887 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5889 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5890 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5892 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5893 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5896 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5897 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5899 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5900 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5906 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5910 if (!selinux_enabled)
5913 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5915 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5917 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5919 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5920 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5922 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5929 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5931 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5932 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5934 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5936 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5937 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5938 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5943 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5945 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5946 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5949 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5951 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5952 static int selinux_disabled;
5954 int selinux_disable(void)
5956 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5958 if (ss_initialized) {
5959 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5963 if (selinux_disabled) {
5964 /* Only do this once. */
5968 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5970 selinux_disabled = 1;
5971 selinux_enabled = 0;
5973 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5974 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5976 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5977 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5979 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */