2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
19 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
20 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 #include <linux/module.h>
24 #include <linux/init.h>
25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
27 #include <linux/errno.h>
28 #include <linux/sched.h>
29 #include <linux/security.h>
30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
31 #include <linux/capability.h>
32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mman.h>
35 #include <linux/slab.h>
36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
37 #include <linux/swap.h>
38 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
72 #include <linux/selinux.h>
73 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
81 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
82 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
84 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
85 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
86 extern int selinux_compat_net;
88 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
89 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
91 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
93 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
96 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
100 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
102 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
104 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
107 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
109 int selinux_enabled = 1;
112 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
113 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
115 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
116 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
117 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
118 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
119 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
121 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
122 before the policy was loaded. */
123 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
124 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
126 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
128 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
129 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
130 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
136 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
140 if (!buffer || !size)
141 goto getsecurity_exit;
145 goto getsecurity_exit;
147 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
154 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
156 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
158 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
160 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
165 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
166 task->security = tsec;
171 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
173 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
174 task->security = NULL;
178 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
180 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
181 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
183 isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
187 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
188 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
189 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
191 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
192 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
193 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
194 inode->i_security = isec;
199 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
201 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
202 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
204 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
206 list_del_init(&isec->list);
207 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
209 inode->i_security = NULL;
210 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
213 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
218 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
223 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
224 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
225 file->f_security = fsec;
230 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
232 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
233 file->f_security = NULL;
237 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
239 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
241 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
245 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
248 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
250 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
251 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
252 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sb->s_security = sbsec;
258 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
260 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
262 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
263 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
264 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
265 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
267 sb->s_security = NULL;
271 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
273 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
275 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
326 static match_table_t tokens = {
327 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
328 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
329 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
330 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
333 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
335 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
336 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
337 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
341 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
342 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
351 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
352 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
353 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
356 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
357 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
361 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
366 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
368 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
369 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
372 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
373 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
374 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
379 name = sb->s_type->name;
381 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
383 /* NFS we understand. */
384 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
385 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
387 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
391 context = d->context;
398 /* Standard string-based options. */
399 char *p, *options = data;
401 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
403 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
408 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
412 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
414 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
417 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
428 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
430 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
433 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
440 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
443 case Opt_rootcontext:
444 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
446 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
449 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
456 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
460 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
462 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
463 "defcontext option is invalid "
464 "for this filesystem type\n");
467 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
469 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
472 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
479 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
484 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
495 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
497 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
499 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
500 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
501 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
505 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
513 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
514 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
515 * the superblock context if not already set.
518 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
520 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
521 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
522 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
527 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
532 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
536 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
538 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
542 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
543 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
544 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
546 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
547 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
548 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
552 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
557 isec->initialized = 1;
561 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
563 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
564 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
565 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
569 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
572 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
576 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
590 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
592 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
593 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
594 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
597 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
598 if (sbsec->initialized)
601 if (!ss_initialized) {
602 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
603 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
604 server is ready to handle calls. */
605 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
606 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
607 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
608 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
612 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
613 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
615 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
616 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
620 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
624 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
625 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
626 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
627 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
628 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
629 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
630 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
631 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
632 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
636 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
637 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
638 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
639 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
640 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
641 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
644 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
645 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
650 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
653 sbsec->initialized = 1;
655 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
656 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
657 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
660 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
661 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
662 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
665 /* Initialize the root inode. */
666 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
668 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
669 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
670 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
672 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
674 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
675 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
676 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
677 struct inode_security_struct, list);
678 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
679 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
680 inode = igrab(inode);
682 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
686 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
687 list_del_init(&isec->list);
690 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
692 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
696 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
698 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
700 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
702 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
704 return SECCLASS_FILE;
706 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
710 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
712 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
716 return SECCLASS_FILE;
719 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
721 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
724 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
726 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
729 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
736 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
738 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
745 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
746 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
748 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
750 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
751 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
753 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
755 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
761 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
762 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
763 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
764 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
765 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
767 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
769 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
770 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
771 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
773 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
775 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
776 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
777 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
778 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
779 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
781 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
784 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
786 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
788 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
791 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
794 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
795 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
800 char *buffer, *path, *end;
802 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
812 while (de && de != de->parent) {
813 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
817 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
822 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
823 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
827 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
835 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
836 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
838 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
839 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
841 struct dentry *dentry;
842 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
843 char *context = NULL;
847 if (isec->initialized)
850 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
851 if (isec->initialized)
854 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
855 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
856 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
857 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
858 server is ready to handle calls. */
859 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
860 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
861 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
862 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
866 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
867 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
868 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
869 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
873 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
874 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
876 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
877 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
879 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
880 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
883 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
884 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
889 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
890 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
896 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
899 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
900 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
908 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
914 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
920 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
921 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
922 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
923 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
927 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
928 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
931 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
934 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
935 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
936 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
937 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
939 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
947 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
948 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
950 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
951 /* Default to the fs SID. */
952 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
954 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
955 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
956 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
964 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
965 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
968 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
969 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
972 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
974 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
975 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
986 isec->initialized = 1;
989 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
991 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
992 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
996 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
997 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1003 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1004 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1007 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1008 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1011 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1012 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1015 /* All other signals. */
1016 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1023 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1024 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1025 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1026 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1029 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1031 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1032 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1033 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1034 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1037 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1038 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1041 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1042 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1044 tsec = tsk->security;
1046 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1050 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1051 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1054 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1055 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1058 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1060 tsec = tsk->security;
1062 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1063 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1066 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1067 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1068 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1069 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1070 struct inode *inode,
1072 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1074 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1075 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1076 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1078 tsec = tsk->security;
1079 isec = inode->i_security;
1083 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1084 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1087 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1090 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1091 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1092 pathname if needed. */
1093 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1094 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1095 struct dentry *dentry,
1098 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1099 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1100 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1102 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1103 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1106 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1107 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1108 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1109 check a particular permission to the file.
1110 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1111 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1112 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1113 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1114 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1118 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1119 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1120 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1121 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1122 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1123 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1126 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1128 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1130 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1131 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1139 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1141 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1146 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1147 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1148 struct dentry *dentry,
1151 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1152 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1153 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1155 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1158 tsec = current->security;
1159 dsec = dir->i_security;
1160 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1162 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1163 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1165 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1166 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1171 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1172 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1174 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1180 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1184 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1185 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1186 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1189 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1190 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1191 struct task_struct *ctx)
1193 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1195 tsec = ctx->security;
1197 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1201 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1204 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1205 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1206 struct dentry *dentry,
1210 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1211 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1212 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1216 tsec = current->security;
1217 dsec = dir->i_security;
1218 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1220 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1221 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1224 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1225 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1240 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1244 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1248 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1249 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1250 struct inode *new_dir,
1251 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1253 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1254 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1255 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1257 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1260 tsec = current->security;
1261 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1262 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1263 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1264 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1266 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1268 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1269 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1270 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1273 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1274 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1277 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1278 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1279 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1284 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1285 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1286 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1287 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1288 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1291 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1292 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1293 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1294 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1296 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1304 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1305 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1306 struct super_block *sb,
1308 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1310 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1311 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1313 tsec = tsk->security;
1314 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1315 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1319 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1324 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1325 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1326 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1327 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1330 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1332 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1336 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1338 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1340 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1347 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1348 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1352 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1354 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1355 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1364 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1366 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1368 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1369 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1372 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1376 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1377 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1378 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1379 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1383 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1384 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1388 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1392 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1395 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1396 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1400 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1404 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1407 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1408 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1410 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1413 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1417 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1421 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1424 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1428 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1432 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1436 tsec = current->security;
1438 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1439 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1441 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1442 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1445 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1446 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1448 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1449 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1457 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1458 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1464 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1477 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1479 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1484 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1486 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1489 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1495 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1497 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1500 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1504 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1509 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1510 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1511 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1513 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1514 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1515 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1516 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1518 case 0: /* Close log */
1519 case 1: /* Open log */
1520 case 2: /* Read from log */
1521 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1522 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1524 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1531 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1532 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1533 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1535 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1536 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1537 * the capability is granted.
1539 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1540 * processes that allocate mappings.
1542 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1544 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1545 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1547 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1549 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1550 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1551 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1557 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1560 /* binprm security operations */
1562 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1564 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1566 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1571 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1574 bprm->security = bsec;
1578 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1580 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1581 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1582 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1583 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1585 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1588 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1592 bsec = bprm->security;
1597 tsec = current->security;
1598 isec = inode->i_security;
1600 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1601 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1603 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1604 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1605 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1606 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1608 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1609 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1610 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1613 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1614 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1615 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1620 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1621 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1622 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1624 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1627 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1628 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1629 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1633 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1634 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1635 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1639 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1640 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1644 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1645 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1647 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1655 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1657 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1661 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1663 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1666 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1667 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1668 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1669 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1670 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1672 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1675 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1678 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1680 kfree(bprm->security);
1681 bprm->security = NULL;
1684 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1685 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1687 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1688 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1690 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1691 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1692 struct tty_struct *tty;
1693 struct fdtable *fdt;
1696 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1697 tty = current->signal->tty;
1700 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1702 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1703 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1704 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1705 file may belong to another process and we are only
1706 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1707 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1708 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1709 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1710 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1711 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1712 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1717 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1719 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1723 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1725 unsigned long set, i;
1730 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1731 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1733 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1736 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1737 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1742 if (file_has_perm(current,
1744 file_to_av(file))) {
1746 fd = get_unused_fd();
1756 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1757 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1764 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1769 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1772 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1775 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1777 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1778 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1782 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1784 tsec = current->security;
1786 bsec = bprm->security;
1789 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1791 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1792 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1793 unchanged and kill. */
1794 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1795 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1796 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1803 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1804 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1805 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1806 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1807 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1819 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1821 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1823 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1824 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1825 struct itimerval itimer;
1826 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1829 tsec = current->security;
1830 bsec = bprm->security;
1833 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1836 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1839 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1840 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1842 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1843 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1844 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1845 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1846 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1847 will be checked against the new SID. */
1848 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1849 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1851 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1852 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1853 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1854 flush_signals(current);
1855 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1856 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1857 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1858 recalc_sigpending();
1859 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1862 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1863 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1864 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1865 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1866 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1867 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1868 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1869 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1870 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1872 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1873 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1875 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1876 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1877 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1878 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1880 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1882 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1885 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1889 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1890 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1891 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1894 /* superblock security operations */
1896 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1898 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1901 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1903 superblock_free_security(sb);
1906 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1911 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1914 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1916 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1917 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1918 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1919 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1922 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1929 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1933 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1936 int current_size = 0;
1945 while (current_size < len) {
1955 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1957 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1958 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1959 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1965 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1966 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1967 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1971 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1979 in_save = in_end = orig;
1983 open_quote = !open_quote;
1984 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
1986 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1988 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1989 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1991 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1993 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1995 } while (*in_end++);
1997 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1998 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2003 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2005 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2008 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2012 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2013 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2014 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2017 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2019 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2021 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2022 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2023 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2026 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2027 struct nameidata *nd,
2029 unsigned long flags,
2034 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2038 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2039 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2040 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2042 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2046 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2050 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2054 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2055 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2058 /* inode security operations */
2060 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2062 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2065 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2067 inode_free_security(inode);
2070 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2071 char **name, void **value,
2074 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2075 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2076 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2079 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2081 tsec = current->security;
2082 dsec = dir->i_security;
2083 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2085 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2086 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2088 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2089 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2092 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2093 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2096 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2101 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2102 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2103 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2104 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2106 isec->initialized = 1;
2109 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2113 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2120 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2132 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2134 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2137 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2141 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2144 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2147 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2151 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2154 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2157 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2159 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2162 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2164 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2167 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2169 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2172 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2176 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2180 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2183 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2184 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2186 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2189 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2191 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2194 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2198 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2201 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2204 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2205 struct nameidata *nd)
2209 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2214 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2218 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2219 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2222 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2226 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2230 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2233 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2234 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2235 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2237 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2240 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2242 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2245 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2247 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2248 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2249 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2250 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2251 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2255 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2256 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2257 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2258 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2259 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2260 Restrict to administrator. */
2264 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2265 ordinary setattr permission. */
2266 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2269 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2270 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2273 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2276 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2277 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2279 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2280 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2284 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2288 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2289 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2293 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2298 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2300 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2301 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2305 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2306 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2308 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2309 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2313 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2314 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2318 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2320 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2321 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2329 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2331 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2334 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2336 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2339 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2341 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2342 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2343 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2344 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2345 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2346 Restrict to administrator. */
2350 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2351 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2352 permission for removexattr. */
2353 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2356 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2357 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2361 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2363 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2367 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2368 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2369 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2371 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2373 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2375 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2377 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2380 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2383 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2384 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2386 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2390 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2393 if (!value || !size)
2396 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2404 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2406 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2407 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2408 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2412 /* file security operations */
2414 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2417 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2420 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2424 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2425 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2428 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2429 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2433 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2436 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2438 return file_alloc_security(file);
2441 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2443 file_free_security(file);
2446 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2458 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2460 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2461 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2464 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2466 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2467 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2470 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2474 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2479 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2482 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2483 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2486 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2492 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2494 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2495 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2497 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2498 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2499 * This has an additional check.
2501 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2508 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2509 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2511 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2512 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2515 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2516 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2518 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2523 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2524 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2528 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2532 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2535 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2536 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2539 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2540 unsigned long reqprot,
2545 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2549 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2552 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2553 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2555 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2556 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2557 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2559 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2560 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2561 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2562 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2563 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2565 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2566 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2567 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2568 * modified content. This typically should only
2569 * occur for text relocations.
2571 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2579 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2582 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2584 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2587 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2594 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2599 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2600 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2609 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2610 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2615 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2620 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2624 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2631 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2633 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2634 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2636 tsec = current->security;
2637 fsec = file->f_security;
2638 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2643 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2644 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2648 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2649 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2651 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2652 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2654 tsec = tsk->security;
2655 fsec = file->f_security;
2658 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2660 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2662 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2663 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2666 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2668 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2671 /* task security operations */
2673 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2677 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2681 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2684 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2686 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2689 tsec1 = current->security;
2691 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2694 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2696 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2697 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2699 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2700 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2701 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2702 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2703 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2705 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2706 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2707 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2708 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2713 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2715 task_free_security(tsk);
2718 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2720 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2721 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2722 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2723 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2724 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2729 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2731 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2734 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2736 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2740 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2742 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2745 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2747 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2750 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2752 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2755 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2757 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2760 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2762 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2766 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2770 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2774 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2777 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2779 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2782 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2784 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2787 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2789 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2792 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2796 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2797 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2798 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2799 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2800 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2801 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2806 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2808 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2811 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2813 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2816 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2818 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2821 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2826 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2828 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2832 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2836 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2838 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2841 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2843 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2847 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2853 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2854 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2855 the state of the current process. */
2859 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2863 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2865 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2868 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2870 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2872 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2875 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2876 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2880 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2881 struct inode *inode)
2883 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2884 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2886 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2887 isec->initialized = 1;
2891 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2892 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2894 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2895 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2897 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2898 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2902 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2903 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2906 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2907 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2910 switch (ih->protocol) {
2912 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2914 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2918 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2922 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2923 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2928 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2930 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2934 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2938 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2939 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2950 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2952 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2953 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2956 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2957 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2959 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2960 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2964 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2965 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2968 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2969 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2970 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2976 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2978 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2982 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2983 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2988 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2990 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2994 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2995 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2999 /* includes fragments */
3009 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3010 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
3014 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3016 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
3020 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3021 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3024 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3026 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
3030 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3031 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3041 /* socket security operations */
3042 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3045 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3046 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3047 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3050 tsec = task->security;
3051 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3053 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3056 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3057 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3058 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3064 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3065 int protocol, int kern)
3068 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3074 tsec = current->security;
3075 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3076 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3077 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3078 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3084 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3085 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3088 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3089 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3090 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3093 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3095 tsec = current->security;
3096 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3097 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3098 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3099 isec->initialized = 1;
3102 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3103 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3104 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock,
3112 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3113 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3114 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3115 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3116 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3118 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3123 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3128 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3129 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3130 * check the first address now.
3132 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3133 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3135 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3136 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3137 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3138 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3139 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3140 unsigned short snum;
3141 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3142 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3144 tsec = current->security;
3145 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3147 if (family == PF_INET) {
3148 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3149 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3150 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3151 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3153 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3154 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3155 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3156 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3159 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3160 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3161 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3162 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3165 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3166 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3167 ad.u.net.family = family;
3168 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3170 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3175 switch(isec->sclass) {
3176 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3177 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3180 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3181 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3185 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3189 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3193 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3194 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3195 ad.u.net.family = family;
3197 if (family == PF_INET)
3198 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3200 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3202 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3203 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3211 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3216 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3221 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3223 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3224 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3225 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3226 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3227 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3228 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3229 unsigned short snum;
3232 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3233 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3234 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3236 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3238 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3239 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3241 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3244 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3245 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3249 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3250 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3251 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3252 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3253 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3262 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3264 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3267 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3270 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3271 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3273 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3277 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3279 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3280 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3281 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3282 newisec->initialized = 1;
3287 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3292 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3296 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3299 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3300 int size, int flags)
3302 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3305 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3307 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3310 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3312 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3315 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3319 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3323 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3326 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3329 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3332 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3334 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3337 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3338 struct socket *other,
3341 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3342 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3343 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3344 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3347 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3351 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3352 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3354 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3355 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3357 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3359 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3363 /* connecting socket */
3364 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3365 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3367 /* server child socket */
3368 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3369 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3370 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3375 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3376 struct socket *other)
3378 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3379 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3380 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3383 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3384 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3386 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3387 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3389 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3390 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3397 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3398 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3401 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3402 struct socket *sock;
3406 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3407 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3409 struct inode *inode;
3410 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3412 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3413 isec = inode->i_security;
3414 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3415 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3418 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3425 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3429 switch (sock_class) {
3430 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3431 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3432 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3433 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3436 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3437 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3438 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3439 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3443 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3444 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3448 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3452 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3456 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3463 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3464 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3469 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3470 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3477 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3482 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3483 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3485 family = sk->sk_family;
3486 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3489 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3490 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3493 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3494 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3495 ad.u.net.family = family;
3497 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3501 if (selinux_compat_net)
3502 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3505 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3510 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3514 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3519 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3520 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3525 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3526 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3529 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3531 /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3532 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3533 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3534 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3536 else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3537 peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
3538 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3539 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3540 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3542 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3552 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3557 if (scontext_len > len) {
3562 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3566 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3574 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3576 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3579 if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
3580 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3582 peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
3583 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3584 peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3587 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3589 *secid = peer_secid;
3594 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3596 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3599 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3601 sk_free_security(sk);
3604 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3606 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3607 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3609 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3610 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3612 selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec);
3615 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3618 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3620 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3622 *secid = sksec->sid;
3626 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3628 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3629 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3631 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3632 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3633 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3635 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3638 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3639 struct request_sock *req)
3641 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3646 newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
3647 if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
3648 req->secid = newsid;
3652 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &peersid);
3654 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3655 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3656 req->peer_secid = 0;
3660 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3664 req->secid = newsid;
3665 req->peer_secid = peersid;
3669 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3670 const struct request_sock *req)
3672 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3674 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3675 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
3676 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3677 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3678 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3679 time it will have been created and available. */
3681 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3684 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
3685 struct sk_buff *skb)
3687 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3689 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
3692 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3695 fl->secid = req->secid;
3698 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3702 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3703 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3704 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3706 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3710 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3712 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3714 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3715 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3716 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3717 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3718 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3719 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3729 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3734 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3736 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3737 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3738 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3741 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3742 struct socket *sock;
3743 struct inode *inode;
3744 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3746 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3750 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3754 isec = inode->i_security;
3756 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3760 switch (isec->sclass) {
3761 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3762 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3763 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3764 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3767 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3768 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3769 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3770 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3774 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3775 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3779 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3783 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3787 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3794 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3797 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3802 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3809 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3810 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3811 const struct net_device *in,
3812 const struct net_device *out,
3813 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3819 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3820 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3821 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3822 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3828 sksec = sk->sk_security;
3830 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3831 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3832 ad.u.net.family = family;
3834 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
3838 if (selinux_compat_net)
3839 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3840 family, addrp, len);
3842 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3848 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3850 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3853 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3854 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3855 const struct net_device *in,
3856 const struct net_device *out,
3857 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3859 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3862 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3864 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3865 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3866 const struct net_device *in,
3867 const struct net_device *out,
3868 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3870 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3875 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3877 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3881 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3885 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3886 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3891 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3894 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3896 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3900 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3901 ad.u.cap = capability;
3903 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3904 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3907 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3908 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3911 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3912 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3914 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3918 isec->sclass = sclass;
3919 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3920 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3921 perm->security = isec;
3926 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3928 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3929 perm->security = NULL;
3933 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3935 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3937 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3942 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3943 msg->security = msec;
3948 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3950 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3952 msg->security = NULL;
3956 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3959 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3960 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3961 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3963 tsec = current->security;
3964 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3966 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3967 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3969 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3972 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3974 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3977 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3979 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3982 /* message queue security operations */
3983 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3985 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3986 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3987 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3990 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3994 tsec = current->security;
3995 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3997 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3998 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4000 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4003 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4009 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4011 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4014 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4016 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4017 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4018 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4020 tsec = current->security;
4021 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4023 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4024 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4026 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4027 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4030 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4038 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4039 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4042 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4045 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4048 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4054 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4058 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4060 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4061 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4062 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4063 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4066 tsec = current->security;
4067 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4068 msec = msg->security;
4071 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4073 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4075 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4076 * message queue this message will be stored in
4078 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4086 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4087 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4089 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4090 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4093 /* Can this process send the message */
4094 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4095 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4097 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4098 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4099 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4104 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4105 struct task_struct *target,
4106 long type, int mode)
4108 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4109 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4110 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4111 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4114 tsec = target->security;
4115 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4116 msec = msg->security;
4118 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4119 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4121 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4122 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4124 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4125 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4129 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4130 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4132 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4133 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4134 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4137 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4141 tsec = current->security;
4142 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4144 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4145 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4147 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4150 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4156 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4158 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4161 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4164 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4165 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4167 tsec = current->security;
4168 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4170 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4171 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4173 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4174 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4177 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4178 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4186 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4187 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4190 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4193 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4200 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4206 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4210 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4211 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4216 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4220 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4223 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4225 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4228 /* Semaphore security operations */
4229 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4231 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4232 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4233 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4236 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4240 tsec = current->security;
4241 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4243 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4244 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4246 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4249 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4255 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4257 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4260 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4262 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4263 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4264 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4266 tsec = current->security;
4267 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4269 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4270 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4272 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4273 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4276 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4277 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4285 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4286 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4290 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4301 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4304 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4308 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4314 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4318 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4319 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4324 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4328 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4331 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4337 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4339 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4344 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4347 /* module stacking operations */
4348 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4350 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4351 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4352 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4356 secondary_ops = ops;
4358 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4365 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4367 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4368 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4369 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4373 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4378 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4381 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4384 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4385 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4387 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4392 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4399 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4401 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4403 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4404 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4405 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4406 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4407 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4408 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4409 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4410 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4417 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4420 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4421 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4423 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4429 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4430 security attributes. */
4435 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4436 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4437 * above restriction is ever removed.
4439 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4440 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4441 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4442 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4443 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4444 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4445 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4446 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4447 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4448 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4454 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4455 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4456 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4460 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4465 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4466 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4467 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4468 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4469 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4470 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4472 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4473 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4474 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4475 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4476 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4477 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4480 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4481 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4482 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4483 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4484 struct av_decision avd;
4489 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4490 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4491 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4492 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4493 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4494 do_each_thread(g, t)
4495 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4496 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4499 while_each_thread(g, t);
4500 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4503 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4504 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4505 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4509 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4510 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4512 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4513 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4515 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4519 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4520 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4534 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4536 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4539 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4547 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4548 unsigned long flags)
4550 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4551 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4553 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4558 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4559 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4561 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4567 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4569 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4575 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4576 struct task_struct *ctx,
4580 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4581 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4583 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4585 tsec = ctx->security;
4586 ksec = key->security;
4588 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4589 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4590 appear to be created. */
4594 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4595 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4600 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4601 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4602 .capget = selinux_capget,
4603 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4604 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4605 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4606 .capable = selinux_capable,
4607 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4608 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4609 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4610 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4612 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4613 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4615 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4616 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4617 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4618 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4619 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4620 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4621 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4623 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4624 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4625 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4626 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4627 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4628 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4629 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4631 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4632 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4633 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4634 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4635 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4636 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4637 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4638 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4639 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4640 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4641 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4642 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4643 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4644 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4645 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4646 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4647 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4648 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4649 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4650 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4651 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4652 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4653 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4654 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4655 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4657 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4658 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4659 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4660 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4661 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4662 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4663 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4664 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4665 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4666 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4667 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4669 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4670 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4671 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4672 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4673 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4674 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4675 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4676 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4677 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4678 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4679 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4680 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4681 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4682 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4683 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4684 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4685 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4686 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4687 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4688 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4689 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4690 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4691 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4693 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4695 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4696 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4698 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4699 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4700 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4701 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4702 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4703 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4705 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4706 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4707 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4708 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4709 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4711 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4712 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4713 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4714 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4715 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4717 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4718 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4720 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4722 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4723 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4725 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4726 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
4728 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4729 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4731 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4732 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4733 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4734 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4735 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4736 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4737 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4738 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4739 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4740 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4741 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4742 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4743 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4744 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4745 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4746 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4747 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4748 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4749 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
4750 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
4751 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
4752 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
4753 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4754 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
4755 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
4757 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4758 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4759 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4760 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4761 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4762 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4763 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4764 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4765 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4766 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4767 .xfrm_flow_state_match = selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
4768 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4772 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4773 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4774 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4778 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4780 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4782 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4783 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4787 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4789 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4790 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4791 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4792 tsec = current->security;
4793 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4795 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4796 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4797 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4800 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4802 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4803 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4804 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4806 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4807 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4809 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4813 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4814 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4815 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4816 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4817 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4823 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4825 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4827 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4828 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4829 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4830 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4832 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4833 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4834 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4835 struct superblock_security_struct,
4837 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4839 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4840 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4841 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4843 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4845 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4846 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4847 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4850 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4851 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4854 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4855 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4856 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4858 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4860 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4861 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4862 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4864 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4865 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4868 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4870 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4871 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4872 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4874 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4875 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4880 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4884 if (!selinux_enabled)
4887 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4889 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4891 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4893 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4895 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4897 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4905 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4907 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4908 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4910 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4912 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4913 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4914 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4919 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4921 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4922 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4925 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4927 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4928 int selinux_disable(void)
4930 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4931 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4933 if (ss_initialized) {
4934 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4938 if (selinux_disabled) {
4939 /* Only do this once. */
4943 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4945 selinux_disabled = 1;
4946 selinux_enabled = 0;
4948 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4949 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4951 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4952 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4954 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */