Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm...

[karo-tx-linux.git] / security / commoncap.c

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ff9b113bb07cdb9a32328aa6f4cd9c3f4a2d792e..e771cb1b2d7947f0c85651b38cc7c9c1d3da11d7 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -508,15 +509,23 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        }
 skip:
 
+       /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+       if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+               bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
        /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
-        * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
+        * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
+        *
+        * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
         */
        if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) ||
             !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) ||
             !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
            bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
                /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
-               if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+               if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
+                   (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
                        new->euid = new->uid;
                        new->egid = new->gid;
                }