sunrpc: clean up sparse endianness warnings in gss_krb5_wrap.c

Fix the endianness handling in gss_wrap_kerberos_v1 and drop the memset
call there in favor of setting the filler bytes directly.

In gss_wrap_kerberos_v2, get rid of the "ec" variable which is always
zero, and drop the endianness conversion of 0. Sparse handles 0 as a
special case, so it's not necessary.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
index 42560e55d9789e946f5c02e73a0ed4b6c179409d..88cd24aacddc757945e42396538354ded71012b3 100644 (file)
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -201,9 +201,15 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset,
 
        msg_start = ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
 
-       *(__be16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
-       memset(ptr + 4, 0xff, 4);
-       *(__be16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
+       /*
+        * signalg and sealalg are stored as if they were converted from LE
+        * to host endian, even though they're opaque pairs of bytes according
+        * to the RFC.
+        */
+       *(__le16 *)(ptr + 2) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->signalg);
+       *(__le16 *)(ptr + 4) = cpu_to_le16(kctx->gk5e->sealalg);
+       ptr[6] = 0xff;
+       ptr[7] = 0xff;
 
        gss_krb5_make_confounder(msg_start, conflen);
 
@@ -438,7 +444,7 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
        u8              *ptr, *plainhdr;
        s32             now;
        u8              flags = 0x00;
-       __be16          *be16ptr, ec = 0;
+       __be16          *be16ptr;
        __be64          *be64ptr;
        u32             err;
 
@@ -468,16 +474,16 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
        be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr;
 
        blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->acceptor_enc);
-       *be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(ec);
+       *be16ptr++ = 0;
        /* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */
-       *be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(0);
+       *be16ptr++ = 0;
 
        be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr;
        spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
        *be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(kctx->seq_send64++);
        spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
 
-       err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, ec, pages);
+       err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, 0, pages);
        if (err)
                return err;